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PRICEY PURCHASES AND CLASSY CUSTOMERS:
WHY SOPHISTICATED CONSUMERS DO NOT
NEED THE PROTECTION OF TRADEMARK LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION

Knockoff handbags permeate our society. They line the streets of New York
City's Chinatown and have even entered the world of suburban shopping mall
kiosks. Modem society is increasingly label conscious and seems to have an
insatiable desire for the latest hot item, settling for a fake when the real is out of
reach. The law, however, has not been modernized to match the changed
populus, resulting in unjust application of trademark law in certain unique
situations.
One of these unique situations presented itself when Hermes International
filed suit against Steven Stolman to enjoin his importation, distribution, sales and
marketing of the popular "Jelly Kelly."' The Jelly Kelly is a synthetic rubber copy
of Hermes's famous Birkin bag that was the hot item of the summer and fall of
2003.
The Eastern District of New York granted a permanent injunction on October
5, 2003 after the parties reached a confidential agreement. 2 This Note aims to
establish that applying traditional trademark law to this case was unrealistic and
unjustified and that, in unique situations where the goods at issue are very
expensive and rare, the traditional test of consumer sophistication should trump
the other factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Part L.A identifies the history of handbags and their evolution in society over
the past 1,500 years. Part I.B illustrates the history of Hermes. Part I.C depicts
the background of trademark law principles applicable to this Note, including the
likelihood of confusion test. Part II analyzes the different types of confusion
applicable to Hermes's claim, including point-of-sale and post-sale confusion.
The analysis sections are further broken down into analyses of the elements of
each type of confusion, and detail what jurisdictions outside the Second Circuit
and the Third Restatement on the Law of Unfair Competition have said regarding
the consumer sophistication issue.
In conclusion, this Note argues for a more realistic standard in a unique area
of trademark law. When the goods at issue are very expensive and elusive, the
consumer sophistication analysis should be given dispositive weight rather than
the nominal mention it receives from the Second Circuit generally, and as it was

1 Hermes Int'l v. Steven Stolman,

Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 3722 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003).

2 Id.
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assumedly given in the Stolman case.3 Allowing above-average sophistication to
trump the other likelihood of confusion factors preserves the intent of Congress
in passing federal trademark laws, in that it does not thwart the goal of protecting
consumers from being misled, but it also fosters free market competition by not
repressing entrepreneurs who pose no harm to the goodwill of the trademark
holder. Traditional application of the likelihood of confusion standard in these
unique cases obviates the rationale of the confusion standard, whereas a practical
look at the real situation would produce a result consistent with congressional
intent.
A. HISTORY OF HANDBAGS

A handbag is more than a collection of fabric sewn together and more than a
place to hold a wallet and keys. A handbag is a reflection of the person who
carries it, coming in different shapes, sizes, colors and textures. There are
different bags for different outfits and different moods. They are an extension
of a person, yet "unperturbed by the changes of the body or the heavy hand of
age." 4 It is no wonder that they have been revered as accessories over the past
1,500 years.
One of the earliest handbags was a pouch type bag from Scythia, which was
worn dangling from the waist.' Purses were worn by both men and women
throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance.6 In the Fourteenth Century, the
bags were adorned with jewels and embroidery for decoration and to show social
status.7 That is, the wealthier the person, the more adorned his or her bag.
By the Seventeenth Century, men's trousers were made with sewn-in pockets,
and handbags became primarily a woman's accessory.' In the Eighteenth Century,
women started to wear more fitted clothing and needed more fashionable
handbags to match their various outfits.9 These handbags were called reticules
and commonly carried rouge, face powder, a fan, and smelling salts.1" The term
"handbag" was first used in the early 1900s in reference to men's luggage bags."

3 id.
4 ANNA JOHNSON, HANDBAGS: THE POWER OF THE PURSE, at xviii (2002).
s Id. at xxiii.
6 Id. at xx-xxii.
7 HISTORYOF HANDBAGS, athttp://www.henriettashandbags.com/aihstory-of-handbags.
html (last visited Dec. 30, 2003).
JOHNSON, $mpranote 4, at xxiii.
HISTORYOF HANDBAGS, athttp://www.henriettashandbags.com/a,_-hstory-of-handbags.

html, supra note 7.
10 Id

IIId.
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In the 1920s, the women's revolution altered attitudes about clothing and
accessories, including reversing the belief that the handbag had to match the
outfit. 2 The past eighty years have seen a transformation in fabrics and designs,
as well as the rise of certain fashion houses, such as Prada, Gucci, Dior, and
Hermes. Although handbags have evolved over time, one aspect has remained
the same: the power of the purse to speak about its carrier without saying a word.
B.

HISTORY OF HERMES

In Greek mythology, Hermes was the messenger of the gods, son of Zeus,
brother of Apollo, and often depicted with winged sandals and a golden
caduceus.' 3 Less commonly known is that Hermes was the god of commerce,
protecting traders and herders. 4 Thus, it is not surprising that the house known
for luxury items and elegance now wants to invoke that same protection for the
goods bearing his name.
Hermes International originally captured the world's attention with its equine
harnesses in 1837." For the last 165 years Hermes has produced scarves, ties,
home furnishings, perfumes, and leather goods.16 Based in the rue St. Honore'
fashion district of Paris, Hermes first offered its products for sale in the United
States in 1924.17 These products are sold exclusively in Hermes boutiques and
other select stores licensed to sell the goods.' Two of it's most famous products
are the Kelly bag and the Birkin bag. The Kelly bag gained fame after Grace Kelly
was photographed with the handbag on the cover of LIFE magazine in 1956.'9
The Birkin bag was developed in the 1980s after Jane Birkin sat next to JeanLouis Dumas on an airplane and complained to him about the small size of the
Kelly bag. 0 Each bag has the same trapezoidal shape, with a small, semi-circular

12 id.
13 HERMES, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefAricle.aspx?refid=761572158&

pn=l (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
14 Id.
" Complaint 8, Hermes Int'l v. Steven Stolman, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 1782 (E.D.N.Y. July 31,
2003) [hereinafter Complaint].
16 Id.
17 Id.19.
18 Id. 10.
Lynn Hirschberg, In the Beginnin& Them was Leather.
(Magazine), at 114.
20 Complaint, supra note 15, 13.

N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2003, § 6
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handle and flap design, with the Birkin bag being the larger of the two. 2 Since its
creation, the bag has become a status symbol for the well-to-do and wealthy."2
One reason for the bag's prestige is the craftsmanship of the bag itself. Each
Birkin bag is made by one senior craftsman who works on it from start to finish. 3
Each craftsman has been trained exclusively by Hermes for five years before he
or she is allowed to make a bag on his own. 4 Furthermore, if the bag ever needs
repair, it will be repaired by the same craftsman who made the bag or a craftsman
who was trained by the original creator.2 5 The bags are created with only absolute
perfection in mind; thus, if there is any problem or defect in the bag, it is
destroyed.2 6 The amount of detail is unparalleled. The goat skin lining is always
sewn first, then the base of the bag, then the sides, and then the handle.2 ' The
seams and handle of the bag are filed with sandpaper and dyed to match the bag,
making the entire structure appear seamless and supple.2 8 The bag is sealed with
hot wax to protect it from moisture and then finally ironed gently to remove any
remaining creases from the leather.2 9 After breaking down this eighteen hour
process, the starting price of $5,000 makes a little more sense, as does the
extremely long waiting list.' These bags are not mass produced items, and their
craftsmanship leads to their prestige.

2'

Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)

1257, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Ledererde Paris11.
2 The Birkin bag gained recent fame and press when the HBO hit television show Sex and the
City featured the handbag. In the episode, Samantha tried to get around the five year waiting list by
saying she was purchasing the bag for her public relations client, Lucy Liu. Undoubtedly, the
devastation shown when her plan backfired has been felt by many women who can afford the bags
yet must wait for one to be made. Sex and the City: Coulda, Woulda, Sboolda (HBO television
broadcast, Aug. 5, 2001). Even more recently, the Birkin bag received tremendous press coverage
when Martha Stewart carried her Birkin to court during her securities fraud trial. One journalist
noted that the bag's owners viewed it as a "talisman that should confer upon them a whispered, quiet
verdict: classy." Alex Kuczynski, On This Accessory, The Jury Isn't Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2004.
' JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 58-59.
24 Complaint, supra note 15, 14.
25

Id.

26

id.

27 JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 58-61.
28

Id.

29

Id

o When questioned about the waiting list for the Birkin and Kelly bags at the Hermes boutique
in Lenox Square, Atlanta, Ga., the sales associate replied that the list was "closed." She further stated
that the waiting list ranges from one to five years depending on what type of material the customer
wants and how soon it is available. Interview with Hermes employee, Hermes boutique, Lenox
Square, in Atlanta, Ga. (Dec. 30, 2003).
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The materials also add to the bags' reputation and fame. Hermes only selects
five percent of the leather that is sent to it from suppliers.3 Although the bags
are most commonly seen in leather, they have been made out of crocodile, canvas,
denim, ostrich and plastic.3 2 The material is determined by the purchaser, again
making the bag an expression of the individual.33
The final defining feature of the Kelly and Birkin bags is the unique lock and
flap closure. The design consists of two thin, horizontal leather straps with metal
plates at each end that fit over a circular turn lock. 4 This lock can then be
secured with a small padlock.35 Hermes's trademark on this design is at the heart
of the suit filed by Hermes International against Steven Stolman on July 30,
2003.36
C.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF TRADEMARK LAW

A trademark is any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination which
is used to identify and distinguish goods or products from other goods and
products. 3' Trademarks are also used to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown. 38 Furthermore, trademarks are linked to a company's
most valuable assets: its goodwill and identification of its goods and services.
Trademark rights are "not doctrinally intended to provide any right of exclusivity"
with respect to the products and services established by the marks.' Trademarks
are intended to "protect consumers from being confused, mistaken, or deceived
in their purchasing decisions"'" because they can rely on marks with which they
42
are familiar to serve as accurate source and quality indicators.

Complaint, supra note 15, 15.
Id. 16.
31JOHNSON, supranote 4, at 58.
3 Ledererde ParisI,50 F. Supp. 2d at 215.
31
32

35 Id.
36

Stolman, 03 Civ. 3722.

37 Lanham Act, § 45(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
38 Id.
31 Scott Harvison,Comment, Two Wmngs Maki'g a Right Using the Thirdand Ninth Circuitsfora
Uniform Standardof Fame in FederalDilution Law, 25 SEATrE U. L. REV.867, 869 (2002).
4 Ann Bartow, Likekhood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 721, 725 (2004).
41 Id.at 737; see also Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 375, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1641 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the "underlying purpose of the Lanham
Act... is protecting consumers and manufacturers from deceptive representations of affiliation and
origin').
4_See Bartow, supra note 40, at 730.
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Trademarks were governed by common law until Congress passed the first
trademark statute in 1870. 4" The first federal trademark law allowed the
trademark holder to seek an injunction against infringers to prevent the loss of
customers and profits." Since this initial law, courts and Congress have tried to
balance the goals of free markets and competition with those of protection and
identity.4" When the 1870 law was declared unconstitutional in 1879, trademark
holders continued to press Congress for protection." Congress granted that
protection by passing the Trademark Act of 1905, which contained more limited
protections than the earlier act.4' As the economy and markets became more
complicated and intertwined, some people argued for stricter, more comprehensive trademark protection. 4
The Trademark Act of 1946, commonly referred to as the Lanham Act, was
49
the protection for which many of those trademark holders were searching.
While the 1905 Act was based on direct competition and goods with the "same
descriptive properties," the Lanham Act focuses on the likelihood of consumer
confusion."0 Thus, if a trademark holder is using a mark in commerce to identify
its goods, the Lanham Act provides a civil cause of action for trademark
5
infringement against those who use the mark in a way likely to cause confusion. 1

41 See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 2 tit. 60, §5 4937-4947, 16 Stat. 198 (declared unconstitutional in
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97-99 (1879)). Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Comment, Famous
Trademarks: Ordinay Inquiy by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraorinagy Remedy, 64 BROOK. L.
REv. 423, 427 (1998).
4 Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 43.
41 Id. at 428.

46 Id.
17 Trademark Act of 1905, c. 592, sec. 16, 33 Stat. 724. The 1905 Act only provided relief for
the unauthorized use of a registered mark on "merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties." See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The WhittingAway of the Rational Basisfor
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PIrt. L. REv. 789, 802-04 (1997).
' Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 43, at 428.

49 15 U.S.C. %§1051-1127 (2000).

o Mahaffey-Dowd, supra note 43, at 429.
s 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The text of the statute reads, in relevant part, as follows:
1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol12/iss1/9

6

Goodwin: Pricey Purchases and Classy Customers: Why Sophisticated Consumer

2004]

HIGH CLASS CONSUMER SOPHISTICATION

light of a
Courts have noted that "the Lanham Act must be construed in5 the
2
strong federal policy in favor of vigorously competitive markets."
Likewise, courts have held that likelihood of confusion is the "key element"
of trademark infringement actions.5 3 Under both trademark infringement and
trade dress infringement, the "central inquiry" is whether there exists a likelihood
that consumers will be confused.' Likelihood of confusion exists when either an
"appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or
indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question"5 5 or when
"consumers are likely to believe that the challenged use of a trademark is
somehow sponsored, endorsed, or authorized by its owner." 6
In the Second Circuit, the judicially created "likelihood of confusion" test is
based on eight different factors: (1)the strength of the plaintiff's trademark, (2)
the degree of similarity between the parties' marks, (3) the proximity of the
products, (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will "bridge the gap" between the
products, (5) the existence of actual confusion, (6) the defendant's good faith, (7)
the quality of the defendant's product, and (8) the sophistication of the
consumers.5 7 Although the courts have applied these factors in many cases, they
have rarely held that any one is dispositive on the issue of likelihood of

12

Landscape Forms, 113 F.3d at 379; see also Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc.,

269 F.3d 114, 119, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1041 (2d Cir. 2001) (enunciating the purpose
underlying trade dress protection, i.e. to protect consumers and manufacturers from deceptive
representations of origin or source).
53 Gruner &Jahr USA Publ'g v. Meredith Corp., 991 F.2d 1072, 1074, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1583, 1586 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 80, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1506, 1510 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that likelihood of confusion is the "hallmark of any
trademark infringement claim").
s4See La Cibeles, Inc. v. Adipar, Ltd., No. 99 Civ. 4129,2000 WL 1253240, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
1, 2000) (quoting Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1511, 1513 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773,
23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1085 (1992) (holding that the protection of trademarks and of trade
dress under §43(a) serve the same statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition
and that there is "no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two'); Rosenthal A.G. v.
Ritelite, Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 133, 139,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1249, 1253 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (explaining
that both claims of trademark and trade dress infringement require proof of essentially the same
elements).
" Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44,47, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65, 66 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
56 N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 555, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1260, 1263 (2d Cir. 2002).
5' Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495,128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411,413 (2d
Cir. 1961).
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confusion. 8 Most courts analyze each factor and look at the balance.59 Thus, one
strong factor can tip the balance in favor of likelihood of confusion, just as the
absence of a few factors can tip the balance away from a finding of infringement.
Courts have made clear that confusion must exist in order for a trademark
holder to prevail in an infringement claim.6" Specifically, a probability, and not a
mere possibility, of confusion must exist to support a trademark or trade dress
infringement claim.61 Consumer confusion cannot exist over similarity "in the
abstract," rather confusion must stem from the similarity between the two
trademarks.62 Establishing probability of success on the merits of a confusion
claim is therefore necessary to obtain an injunction in an infringement action. In
Stolman, the Eastern District of New York granted a permanent injunction,
leading to the reasonable inference that something in Hermes's claim would tip
the balance on the merits in favor of a likelihood of confusion.6 3 This Note will
argue that this conclusion is erroneous given the dominance of the consumer
sophistication factor in this particular situation.
An interesting aspect of Stolman and similar cases is that the judges seem to
make their evaluations of sophistication without any evidence.64 The court
conducted a hearing in Stolman on September 18, 2003 but held no trial where a
reasonable fact finder would have had the opportunity to examine the sophistication and care used by the relevant class of purchasers.6" This is significant 66
because
likelihood of confusion is based on the "court's estimation," not proof.
Courts have interpreted section 43(a) of the Lanham Act67 to protect a
product's trade dress, covering the product's "total image and overall appear-

" See Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43,48, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051, 1055
(2d Cit. 2000) (holding that any one Polaroidfactor may prove to be dispositive).
'9 See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1042, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1160, 1167 (2d Cit. 1992) (holding that the Polaroidanalysis is "not a mechanical measurement" and that court should look "to the totality of the product" in making its likelihood of
confusion determination).
o Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1506

(2d Cir. 1998).

61 Estee Lauder Inc. v. Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1511, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1228, 1232 (2d
Cir. 1997); Gruner &Jahr,991 F.2d at 1077; accordElvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,
193, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1740 (5th Cit. 1998).
62 Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 70, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010,

1013 (2d Cit. 1994).
63 Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
64 Bartow, supra note 40, at 772.
61 Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
66 See Bartow, supra note 40, at 763 ("[T]he test is not premised on proof that an appreciable
number of typical consumers have been confused, only that they are likely to be confused.").
67 15 U.S.C. § 11259(a).
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ance," 6 including "features such as size, shape, color or color combinations,
texture, [or] graphics." 69 The United States Supreme Court recently commented
on trade dress protection in 2001, recognizing the importance of limiting trade
dress protection so as not to chill competition.7" Before a product's trade dress
can be afforded this protection, however, the trade dress must be "(1) either (a)
inherently distinctive, or (b) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning; (2) a likelihood of confusion exists between the trade dress of the
original product and that of the knockoff product; and (3) the trade dress
employed serves no utilitarian or aesthetic functionality."'" While the distinctiveness and functionality aspects of trade dress are important in an overall analysis
of a product, this Note will focus solely on the element of likelihood of
confusion. Specifically, this Note will deal with point-of-sale confusion, post-sale
7 2
confusion, and the role that "consumer sophistication" plays in these analyses.
II.

ANALYSIS

Likelihood of confusion exists where "an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the
source of the goods in question."7 3 As stated earlier, the Second Circuit

68 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764.
69

Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v.Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 79, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d

(BNA) 1555, 1557 (2d Cit. 1990); see also
Fun-Damental Too, Ltd. v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d
993, 999, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1348, 1352 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that trade dress "encompasses
the design and appearance of the product together with all the elements making up the overall image
that serves to identify the product presented to the consumer"); Erin S. Dufek, Comment, The Same
Uniform, A Different Team: Copycats Suit upfor Competition,60 ALB. L. REV. 1317 (1997).
70 The Court stated:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many instances
there is no prohibition against copying goods and products. In general, unless
an intellectual property right such as patent or copyright protects an item, it will
be subject to copying. ... [C]opying is not always discouraged or disfavored by
the laws which preserve our competitive economy.
Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005
(2001); see also LandscapeFarms, 113 F.3d at 379 (noting that "the Lanham Act must be construed in
light of a strong federal policy in favor of vigorously competitive markets").
71 Dufek, supra at note 69, at 1321.
72 Point-of-sale confusion relates to the confusion of the actual purchaser of the specific good.
In contrast, post-sale confusion has been defined as confusion created when "the purchasers' use
of those goods [the knockoffs] is likely to cause others to be confused with respect to the marks."
Ann K. Wooster, 'Post-Sale Confusion'in Trademark or TradeDress InfringementActs Underif 43 ofLanbam
Trade Mark Act,145 ALR Fed. 407, 418 (1998).
73 Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44,47, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65,66 (2d
Cir. 1978) (per curium).
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74
developed a doctrine for determining likelihood of confusion which is similar
75
to, and often cited by, other circuits. In the famous Polaroidcase in 1960, Judge
Friendly designed the eight factor test to guide a likelihood of confusion analysis,
though he noted that the list is not exclusive.7 6 The Second Circuit later posited
that "the factors are designed to help grapple with the 'vexing' problem of
resolving the likelihood of confusion issue."77 Therefore, "each factor must be
evaluated in the context of how it bears on the ultimate question of likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the product.""
Given the introductory material,79 one can assume that a purchaser, even a
prospective purchaser, of a Hermes Birkin or Kelly bag is sophisticated.
"Sophisticated" is defined as "having a refined knowledge of the ways of the
world cultivated especially through wide experience."' The parenthetical example
given in the dictionary is, interestingly enough, a "sophisticated lady.""
Sophisticated consumers are less likely to confuse the source of a knockoff,
thereby lessening the likelihood ofa successful infringement claim by the plaintifftrademark holder.
Although some other factors weighed in favor of Hermes in their recent claim
in the Eastern District of New York, the eighth Polaroid factor regarding
consumer sophistication did not. 2 In cases such as Stolman, where the goods
being purchased are rare and expensive, the purchasers are typically above the
level of sophistication recognized by most courts. Although the Polaroidfactors
are non-exclusive, the Second Circuit has noted that any one factor may prove to
be dispositive.83 This interpretation, although rarely adopted by courts, would

" Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411,413 (2d
Cit. 1961).
" See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1730 (3d Cit. 1992) (applying the Scott Paerfactors); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L. & L. Wings,
Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1502 (4th Cir. 1992) (applying the PieriaUno factors);
Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (5th Cit.
1986) (applying the Roto-Rooter factors); SquirtCo v. Seven-up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 207 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 897 (8th Cit. 1980) (applying the SquirtCo factors); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 559 F.2d
341, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 808 (9th Cit. 1979) (applying the Skekcraft factors).
76 287 F.2d at 495; see W.W.W. Pharm. Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 572, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1593, 1596 (2d Cit. 1993) (establishing that no one factor is determinative).
' Lois Sportswear, United States Am., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872, 230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 831, 834 (2d Cit. 1986).
78 Id.
71 See supra Part I.A.
80 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DIcTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com.

81Id
s2 See Polaroid,287 F.2d at 495.
8 Nora Beverages Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 119, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1038,
1041 (2d Cir. 2001).
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allow above-average sophistication to carry dispositive weight in a likelihood of
confusion analysis.
A. POINT-OF-SALE CONFUSION

Point-of-sale confusion is confusion that "relates mainly to initial confusion
on the part of those who eventually purchase the products of one of the
parties."' Courts determine the sophistication of consumers by considering the
"general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally
prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such purchasers
usually give in buying that class of goods."' 5 Applying this test to each case as
part of a point-of-sale confusion analysis, it is easy to see why the facts of each
case are so important. In conducting such a fact-specific analysis, courts should
look very closely at the purchaser, recognizing when sophistication should trump
the other Polaroid factors.
1. Impulse Purchases. In W. W. W. Pharmaceulical Co., the plaintiff claimed that
the defendant's use of "Sport Stick" in the defendant's deodorant name violated
the plaintiff's trademark on its lip balm.86 The court clearly distinguished between
the two types of product, labeling lip balm a small item.87 More importantly, the
court described purchasers of small items such as lip balm as "casual purchasers
prone to impulse buying."88 As this Note will discuss in further detail, purchasers
of Birkin and Kelly bags are nothing like the purchasers of lip balm. The three
year waiting list alone denies any possibility of a purchaser acting on impulse.8 9
Buying a Birkin or Kelly bag is inherently different from walking up to a checkout
counter at a drugstore or supermarket and deciding to pick up a new tube of lip
balm. Birkin and Kelly bags are lifetime investments, not subject to frequent
replacement. 90 The traditional consumer sophistication test is applicable to such

4 Wooster, supra note 72, at 418.
SW.W.W. Pbarm. Co., 984 F.2d at 575.
8

Id. at 570.

87 Id

s Id at 575; see also Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. Vandam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 746, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1503, 1509 (2d Cit. 1998) (holding that district court was correct in its analysis that "due to
the fact that the subject maps ... were generally impulse purchases, any lack of sophistication among
buyers could not contribute to confusion between the two maps").
9 Waiting lists average around three years, although reports of the actual time vary between one
and five years. See supra note 30.
90 See In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1289 (Fed.
Cir. 1984); see also Swatch Group (United States) Inc. v. Movado Corp., No. 01 Civ. 0286, 2003 WL
1872656, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2003) (holding that "the average consumer spending hundreds
of dollars on a watch that will be worn for years is likely to give close attention to the type of watch
he or she is buying').
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small items but courts should not apply this generalized standard to claims
involving expensive handbags.
Food products are also classified as goods prone to being purchased without
careful scrutiny.91 In FrankBrunckhorst Co., the trademark owner of Boar's Head
brand deli meats sued the manufacturer of "Boar's Head Red" beer and was
granted a preliminary injunction based on the Polaroidfactors.92 Unlike the court
in Stolman, however, the court noted that purchasers of deli meats and beer were
"generally found.., to leave their sophistication at home."93 Although the court
found the Boar's Head products to be of very high quality, it still recognized that
they are inexpensive, and, like other kitchen staples, subject to less scrutiny and
lower care by the purchaser.94 In Frank Brunckhorst, the Eastern District of New
York, the same court that dismissed Stolman, clearly recognized that the level of
scrutiny afforded certain items and not others plays a large role in the consumer
sophistication analysis.95 The court appears to have declined to take a lack of
impulsivity when buying Birkin or Kelly into account, however, when crafting a
96
permanent injunction and dismissing the case with prejudice.
2. Relevant Purchasers. Courts have also held that likelihood of confusion
"must be assessed by examining the level of sophistication of the relevant
buyers." 97 Furthermore, analysis of sophistication must include "those persons
who are likely to purchase the product.""8 There are two types of purchasers of
knockoff Birkin and Kelly bags-those waiting for the real thing and those who
know they will never own the real thing. Either way, these purchasers are aware
of the Hermes name, its reputation for quality, and its prestige. This sophistication cuts against Hermes's claim of infringement because both types of

91 Frank Brunckhorst Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 875 F. Supp. 966, 983, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d

(BNA) 1102, 1114 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
92 Id at 983-85.

9'Id. at 983.
94 Id

9'Id ('The greater the value of an article the more careful the typical consumer can be expected
to be." (quoting McGregor-Domiger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137,202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
81, 92 (2d Cir. 1979)); seealso Winner Int'l LLC v. Omoi Enter., Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 62, 68
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[The fact that The Club sells for a price that is markedly higher than that of
Global America suggests that consumers may give extra attention to the differences in trade dress
between the two products.'").
9 Hermes Int'l v. Steven Stolman, Ltd., No. 03 Civ. 3722 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2003).
97 StreetiseMaps, 159 F.3d at 746; see, e.g., Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. Onebeacon Ins. Group, 376
F.3d 810 (1st Cir. 2004); Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Inst. Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st

Cit. 1983).
98 Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 35 F.3d 65, 72, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010,
1015 (2d Cir. 1994).
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consumers are much less likely to be confused than other purchasers.99 This
point may seem obvious, but the district court's grant of a permanent injunction
inStolman suggests that the purchasers of these bags should be judged by the
same standards as those purchasers of cheese crackers, deli meats, and lip balm.1 °°
A recent District Court decision gives some hope that courts will employ a
practical and realistic application of the sophistication of consumers factor in the
point-of-sale context.'°1 In the trademark infringement action brought by the
owner of the well-known "Brennan's" in New Orleans against the owner of New
York City's famous "Terrance Brennan's Seafood and Chop House," the court
found that the patrons of each restaurant were sophisticated enough to discern
the difference between the source of each restaurant.10 2 Most important here,
however, is the court's willingness to look at what the consumer was actually
thinking when going to a restaurant. The court in Stolman should have employed
that same analysis to find that the relevant class of purchasers of Hermes's Birkin
and Kelly bags are more likely to purchase based on experience and reputation
rather than the similarity between the products.
3. Price of Goods or Services. Although the difference in location between the
marks could distinguish Brennan's from Stolman, the distinction matters little when
the court's opinion is examined in full. The court focused on the price the
patrons are willing to pay when they attend these restaurants, holding that their
sophistication "is likely to prevent confusion, or if there is incipient confusion,
quickly disabuse it. '10 3 The court also cited a Seventh Circuit decision involving
expensive restaurants in Chicago for its presumption that consumers, such as the
patrons in Brennan's, are sophisticated enough to tell the difference between the
source and sponsorship of each restaurant."1° Although the prices associated with
these restaurants are very high in comparison with the average restaurant, they are
not as high as the prices paid for a Birkin or Kelly bag. Other recent case law
from New York, however, seems to support the conclusion that where products

" See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 220, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1882, 1891 (2d Cit.
1999) ("Consumers who are highly familiar with the particular market segment are less likely to be
confused by similar marks and may discern quite subtle distinctions. Conversely, unsophisticated
customers lack this discrimination and are more vulnerable to the confusion, mistake and
misassociations against which the trademark law protects.").
, See Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
See Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC, No. 02 Civ. 9858, 2003 WL 1338681 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2003).

,"Id at *5.
103 Id

"" Idat *5 (citing Maxim's Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 392, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 319
(7th Cit. 1985) ("[T]he clientele for the sort of restaurant in question in this case... tend to depend

less on the name and more on individual determinations based on experience and individual
reputation.")).
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Contrasting the
are expensive, point-of-sale confusion is less likely to occur.'
Second Circuit's holding in Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,° 6 the
district court in Cartier,Inc. v. FourStarJewely Creations, Inc., inferred a difference
between sophisticated denim purchasers and sophisticated watch purchasers.'
Although the court declined to say whether this factor weighed definitively in
favor of the plaintiff or defendant, the tone of the opinion seems to weigh against
finding likelihood of confusion where the relevant class of purchasers are
sophisticated people intending to buy a very expensive watch.
Finally, the purchasing process involved in obtaining an authentic Birkin or
Kelly bag diminishes the likelihood of point-of-sale confusion. As stated earlier,
the waiting lists for these bags vary in length, but estimates place it between
eighteen months and five years." 8 This distinguishing feature was also recognized
by the court in Arrow FastenerCo. v. Stanley Works, 9 which held that "a consumer
who must possess this high level of knowledge [about the various features of the
defendant's staple gun], and who is also paying a substantial amount of money for
the product, is not likely to be confused.""' The process involved in purchasing
different types of staple guns can be analogized to the different purchasing
processes undertaken when buying the authentic Hermes bag or Mr. Stolman's
Jelly Kelly. As stated earlier, the authentic bags are lifetime purchases, not
impulse buys. The waiting list and manufacturing process alone preclude the real
bags from being impulse purchases. In contrast, the Jelly Kelly could be bought
on a whim after reading about it in the New York Times11' or hearing about it on
the street.

"" Cartier, Inc. v. Four Star Jewelry Creations, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11295, 2003 WL 21056809, at
*11 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2003).
106 799 F.2d at 867.
"7 In Lois Sportswear,the court found that the purchasers of designer jeans were exactly the type
of people who would be confused when they saw the distinct stitching on the jean pockets. Id.
at
874. The court in Cartierdistinguishes the purchasers of expensive watches from expensive jeans,
stating "the court suspects ... that there may be differences between the sophisticated denim
purchaser and the sophisticated watch purchaser, or differences in the contexts in which they make

their purchases, which could make a difference in a court's consideration of this factor." 2003 WL
21056809, at *11.

...
See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, A 'Safire' of a ClassicFails to Amuse the August House of Hermes, N.Y.
TiMF.S, Aug. 12, 2003, at B8.
9 59 F.3d 384, 398-99, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1459 (2d Cir. 1995).
1)
Id The court goes on to note that the level of sophistication entailed in purchasing the

defendant's pneumatic staple gun, which had many more features than the plaintiffs staple gun, was
much higher than a purchaser of the plaintiff's staple gun. The court found that this distinction, as
well as the dramatic difference in price ($20 for plaintiff's product compared to $400 for defendant's
product), tipped the sophistication element to the defendant.
.. See Belafante, supra note 108, at B8.
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4. Other Jurisdiclionsand the Third Restatement. In the point-of-sale context,
some jurisdictions have taken a more realistic approach to consumer sophistication under the likelihood of confusion analysis.' 1 2 Recognizing the sophistication
of consumers and the degree of care they exercise and giving those attributes very
high or even dispositive weight makes these jurisdictions and the Restatement
beacons of practicality. Thus, in a situation such as Stolman, these jurisdictions
would likely give considerable weight to the high level of sophistication of the
purchasers. The Fourth Circuit supports this approach most strongly in Perini
Corp. v. Perini Construction, Inc.," 3 where the court found that no likelihood of
confusion existed because the level of sophistication was so high that the relevant
class of purchasers would not be confused as to the source of construction
services." 4 Although this case deals with similarity between trade names, this
Note takes the position that the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the sophistication
element can be applied when a product's trade dress is at issue. In Perini, the
court found that the ordinary consumer of construction services is a highly
trained professional "whose sensitivity is heightened by the responsibility of
sensibly spending millions of dollars."' 5 The court noted that Perini Corporation
is a large scale, national and international construction firm, while Perini
Construction, Inc. completes construction projects in the mid-Atlantic region." 6
The people and companies looking to each Perini company for their construction
services are very sophisticated, just as a purchaser of a Hermes handbag would be.
Construction services are certainly not "impulse purchases" but are debated and
important decisions. Despite the obvious distinction between the nature of the

112

See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289,

1293 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that "sophistication and expertise of the usual purchasers can preclude
any likelihood of confusion"); Oreck Corp. v. United States Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 173-74,
231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 640 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding that because the relevant purchasers were
professionals within the carpet cleaning business, it was "not the sort of purchasing environment in
which confusion flourishes"); E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457,
465, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1579, 1584 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that "the lack of consumer
sophistication significantly enhances the likelihood of confusion between the two products"); qc.
Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding that the district court gave the sophistication factor "disproportionate significance,"
but also noting that the products at issue are identical).
13 915 F.2d at 127.
14 Id at 128. The Fourth Circuit held that "in a market with extremely sophisticated buyers, the
likelihood of consumer confusion cannot be presumed on the basis of the similarity in trade name
alone, particularly without the benefit of trial."
"5 Id at 127.
16 Id Perini Corporation completed projects all over the world, including hotels in Las Vegas
and Atlantic City, an Israeli airbase, tunnels under Niagara Falls, and sections of the Trans Alaska
Pipeline. Perini Construction built schools, hospitals, prisons and office buildings in Virginia, West
Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania.
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goods and services at issue in Periniand Stolman, a parallel can be drawn between
the level of sophistication of the relevant purchaser and the deference it deserves
from the court.
Although the Sixth Circuit did not go as far as the Fourth Circuit in its
consumer sophistication and degree of care analysis, some of the factors it
focused on suggest that it gives more weight to the relevant sophistication than
the Second Circuit and New York district courts." 7 In Champions Golf Club, the
Sixth Circuit found the sophistication of golf club members important in its
analysis of whether golfers would be confused between clubs bearing virtually the
18
same name in Houston, Texas and Nicholasville, Kentucky. Although the Sixth
Circuit found that the District Court accorded the consumer sophistication factor
"disproportionate significance," the court focused on the District Court's analysis
of the price of the services." 9 The District Court pointed to the fifteen thousand
dollars initiation fee as a primary reason that golfers would not be confused as to
the use of the mark. 2 A purchaser of a golf club membership does not do so on
a whim, much like a purchaser of a Birkin or Kelly bag. Similarly, there
undoubtedly are waiting lists for these golf clubs, just as there are waiting lists for
the Hermes Kelly and Birkin bags. Disregarding price, even if an avid golfer
wanted to join a club in a hurry, giving rise to a possibility of confusion, it is most
likely not possible to do so given the waiting list factor.
The District Court, in Champions Golf Club, also focused on the very slim
chance that golfers would seek membership or plan a vacation to the wrong club
based on confusion over the name.12 1 Because of the high degree of care
involved, as well as the expense of membership or even a vacation, a similar name
is unlikely to immediately confuse an already sophisticated golfer. It is important
to note that the court looked at the relevant class of purchasers, which in this case
was golfers. 22 Golfers, like sophisticated purchasers of expensive handbags,
know the sport and context in which the similar names are used. They are not
outsiders and therefore they will not be confused. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that the District Court applied the confusion analysis incorrectly because the court
did not appreciate that golfers may be confused about the affiliation between the

See Champions Gof Club, 78 F.3d at 1111.
s Id. at 1120. The court held that "the expense of the parties' services combined with the

17

sophistication of the relevant consumers makes it unlikely any consumer would actually choose
Nicholasville's services over Houston's due to Nicholasville's secondary use of the mark."
"' Id. at 1121.
"- Id. at 1120. The District Court relied on "the great expense involved in joining the clubs
[$15,000] ... and concluded that the expense is one reason why relevant consumers are ... unlikely
to be confused by Nicholasville's secondary use of the Champions mark."
121 Id.
Id. at 1120.

'22
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clubs.1 23 The Sixth Circuit fails to recognize, however, that these sophisticated
golfers are "in the know" about their chosen sport. They make decisions about
memberships or vacations having already performed research or spoken with
other golfers, and thus, are unlikely to be confused as to the origin. Again, given
the great expense of joining one of these golf clubs and the knowledge of golfers
about the sport, it is just as unlikely that these golfers will be confused as to the
sponsorship of the Houston and Nicholasville clubs as purchasers of an authentic
Birkin will be confused as to the source of a Jelly Kelly.
It is also unlikely that purchasers of Birkin or Kelly bags would be confused
under the Fifth Circuit's standard. 124 In Oreck, the Fifth Circuit examined the
relevant sophistication of purchasers of carpet cleaning equipment.121 Oreck
marketed its products to hotel chains, hospitals, commercial installations, and
ordinary consumers, while U.S. Floors marketed the Steamex Deluxe 15 XL to
stores that rent the machines for home use, professional carpet cleaners, and
commercial buyers. 26 Most importantly, the court recognized that the purchasers
of U.S. Floor products were "directly responsible for carpet care," deeming them
"virtually certain to be informed, deliberative buyers.' 9 7 The court was also
persuaded by the price of the machines, which cost thousands of dollars, in
making its finding of sophistication.2 2 The Fifth Circuit's ultimate determination
was that "this is not the sort of purchasing environment in which confusion
flourishes.' ' 129 The Eastern District Court in Stolman should have arrived at this
conclusion given the nature of the purchasers and price of the product, both of
which the Fifth Circuit realistically observed and acknowledged in Oreck. By not
allowing the case to proceed past injunctive relief, the merits of the consumer
13 0
sophistication were not examined fully and realistically in Stolman.'
The Federal Circuit has also examined the sophistication of purchasers in the
point-of-sale context, finding it to be a very important factor and a necessary

12-3Id at 1121. The Sixth Circuit noted that the District Court "appears not to have appreciated
that this [the confusion over affiliation question] is the ultimate question to be answered in the
likelihood of confusion inquiry."
124 See Oreck Corp., 803 F.2d at 166.
12' Id at 170. The plaintiff, Oreck, has a trademark on "XL" and "Oreck XL" and produces
vacuum cleaners and rug shampooers. The defendant, United States Floors, manufactures carpet
cleaning equipment machines known as extraction machines under the federally registered trademark
"Steamex." This controversy arose when United States Floors came out with a new model called
the "Steamex Deluxe 15 XL." Id. at 167. The Fifth Circuit concluded that "United States Floor's
limited use of XL presented no likelihood of confusion."
'2 Id. at 172.
127Id. at 173.
128

Id

129

Id. at 174.

IV,

See Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
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In Electronic Design & Sales, the court
element for the trial court to examine.'
held that "the [Trademark Trial and Appeal] Board gave too much weight to
certain DuPont factors, such as the strength of the opposer's mark, and failed to
give due weight to countervailing DuPont factors, such as the sophistication of
'
purchasers."132
The Federal Circuit held that the duty to examine all of the
evidence and circumstances of the purchasing situation made it necessary to
include the purchasers' sophistication.'33 This is the correct analytical framework
to use in undertaking a trademark or trade dress infringement action, especially
one which involves expensive goods purchased by sophisticated, discerning, and
careful consumers.
The Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition takes the most
realistic and practical approach to consumer sophistication.' 34 In describing the
appropriate method to apply the likelihood of confusion factors, the Restatement
notes that "findings as to individual factors are merely discrete aspects of a
comprehensive analysis intended to achieve apracticalevaluationof what consumersare
likely to believe when they encounter the competing designations in the markeplace."'3" Not
surprisingly, section 21 emphasizes an analysis of the market context.'36 Clause
(c) to section 21 deals with the care exercised by purchasers, and comment h
specifically enumerates the factor as "the buying habits of purchasers of the
relevant goods or services and the degree of care they are likely to exercise in
making their purchases."' 137 The language is the same as the factor-filled tests of
other jurisdictions, 3 ' but the application139guidelines given in the comment show
that the difference is in the application.
The Restatement clearly accords weight to the price of the goods or services,
as well as the situation and conditions under which the product or service is

131See Elec. Design & Sales, Inc. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
132 Id at 718. The DuPont factors consist of the Polaroid factors from the Second Circuit plus
some additional factors. In substance, these tests deal with likelihood of confusion in the same way.
In r E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357,1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563,568 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
13 Elec. Design &a aks, 954 F.2d at 718.
134See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 20, 21 (1995).
133 Id § 21, cmt. b (emphasis added).
136 Id ("An analysis of the market context of the use is appropriate in cases involving either

competing or non-competing goods.").
137Id § 21, cmt. h.
t' See, e.g., Merchant & Evans, Inc., 963 F.2d at 637 (applying the Scott Paper factors); Anheuser-

Busch, Inc., 962 F.2d at 320 (applying the Pizzeria Uno factors); AMF Inc., 559 F.2d at 348 (applying
the Skekcrafi factors).
139RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 21, cmt. h.
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purchased.14 ° Comment h to section 21 states that "most purchasers exercise
'
greater care when buying expensive items."141
This statement is followed by
language emphasizing a case-by-case approach, inevitably focusing on the
particular situation.1 42 Given this case-by-case approach, it is easy to see that a
court following the Restatement would have looked at the price of an authentic
Hermes Birkin or Kelly, examined the factors surrounding purchase of an
authentic bag, including the waiting list, the limited stores where one can be
purchased, and the time taken to make each bag under Hermes's intricate process,
and concluded that this is a situation where consumer sophistication and care
should trump the other likelihood of confusion factors. 43
Two main points can be derived from the following sentence in comment h
of section 20: "the attributes [of the consumer] should reflect the particular
market in which the case arises."' 1 44 First, this is a case-by-case approach. In
Stolman, the utmost sophistication should be recognized as paramount. Second,
the use of the word "particular" means that the court should not look to a general
market in handbags. Thus, it is irrelevant to look at the average consumer
purchasing a handbag at a department store, because that is not the particular
market in which Birkin and Kelly bags are sold. Comment h continues in this
realistic and practical vein, stating that the "standard of the reasonable consumer
145
is thus defined by the market context in which the trademark is encountered.,
Therefore, the "nature oftheprospectiveconsumers must be considered in defining the
care exercised by a reasonable purchaser., 46 The prospective purchasers of
Birkin and Kelly bags are sophisticated, and therefore, courts should adopt the
practical approach of the Restatement in cases where the goods are so high in
price and prestige that they are unlike most goods,
thereby making their
1 47
purchasers unlike most (if not all) other consumers.

140 See id.
("If the goods or services are normally purchased only after considerable attention and

inspection, greater similarity between the designations may be permitted than when the goods or
services are purchased casually or impulsively... most purchasers exercise greater care when buying
expensive items.").
141 Id

142Id
143

("[Sluch assumptions must be evaluated in the context of the particular case.").

See id

144 Id
145 Id

146 Id (emphasis added).
147

The obvious counterargument to this sophistication analysis under the Restatement is that a

person willing to pay over $5,000 for a handbag is especially unsophisticated. This Note argues,
however, that while it may seem extremely impractical to buy such a high-end luxury item, given the
price, prestige, and market situation surrounding these bags, the practical and realistic approach is
to deem these purchasers extremely sophisticated.
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Finally, section 20 of the Third Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition
lays out the purpose of trademark law and the class of people it is supposed to
protect. Namely, trademark law protects the "ignorant, the inexperienced, and the
gullible." 4 ' It is inconceivable that the law should protect the purchasers of
Birkin and Kelly bags under this rationale. Hermes's complaint recognizes that
their clientele consists of the "affluent, fashionable consumer," ' dispelling any
notion that they are confused about their own prospective purchasers. Hermes
deliberately markets and advertises to this group of prospective consumers, again
acknowledging that its client base is comprised of the most chic and sophisticated
consumers. 150
Given that purchasers of Birkin and Kelly bags will not be confused in the
point-of-sale context on account of their high level of sophistication, a complete
confusion analysis also must include an examination of the likelihood of
confusion in the post-sale context.
B. POST-SALE CONFUSION

Post-sale confusion occurs when a "manufacturer of knockoff goods offers
consumers a cheap knockoff copy of the original manufacturer's more expensive
product, thus allowing a buyer to acquire the prestige of owning what appears to
be the more expensive product."1 5 ' There are two elements to this sub-doctrine
of confusion-harm to the public and harm to the trademark
of likelihood
1 2
holder.
1. Harm to the Public. As illustrated earlier, the focus of point-of-sale
confusion is whether the actual or prospective purchaser is confused as to the
source or sponsorship of the product or service.' 53 Under the harm to the public
aspect of post-sale confusion, the purchaser of the good may not be confused,
but the general public may be confused as to the source and believe that the
product is genuine. 4
148 R.SI.IIMI

(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPIFITION, § 20 (quoting Stork Rest. v. Sahafi, 166

F.2d 348, 359, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374, 382 (9th Cit. 1948)).
149 Complaint 1 32.
'51 Complaint
30-33.
'51 Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1360,
1363 (2d Cir. 2000) [hereinafter gederer de ParisIll. This is the third type of confusion that exists in
the modem law, although, it is only the second type discussed by this Note. The traditional second
type of confusion is initial interest confusion, which this Note does not cover given its inapplicability
to the subject matter.
152 See id at 107.
1533J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADF.MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPI3;IT1,ION

§ 23:91

(4th ed. 2002).
154 Id

5 23:7.
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Ledererde ParisII cites the Eleventh Circuit's view underlying protection of the
public interest in trademark cases:
It . . . is important to recognize that the enforcement of
trademark laws benefits consumers even where there is no possibility that consumers will be defrauded. For, to the extent that
trademarks provide a means for the public to distinguish between
manufacturers, they also provide incentives for manufacturers to
provide quality goods. Traffickers of these counterfeit goods,
however, attract some customers who would otherwise purchase
the authentic goods. Trademark holders' returns to their investments in quality are thereby reduced. This reduction in profits may
cause trademark holders to decrease their investments in quality
below what they would spend were there no counterfeit goods.
This in turn harms those consumers who wish to purchase higher
quality goods. 5'
Ledererde ParisII and Torkington both recognize the importance of protecting
the general public in the trademark area. There are two conditions implied in
Torkington, however, concerning when the public needs to be protected: when the
manufacturer needs an incentive to produce quality goods, and when the public
needs quality goods." 6 Neither of these conditions is met in a situation like
Stolman, where Hermes has consistently produced high quality goods for over a
hundred years and the public can still obtain the high quality Hermes goods for
the same high price as before.
The notion that Hermes would stop selling high quality goods on account of
someone like Steven Stolman is preposterous and contrary to Hermes's own
claims in the Stolman complaint."5 ' Hermes clearly places great emphasis on its
continuing ability to produce high quality goods for its customers. This ability
continues to satisfy the demand for high quality goods for the very small and
sophisticated group that can afford them. Furthermore, manufacturers have
knocked off Hermes purses frequently over the last fifty years, yet Hermes's
manufacturing process is still the same. The long waiting list also signifies
continuing demand for Birkin and Kelly bags which are still produced in the same
155Ledererde ParisII, 219 F.3d at

108 (quoting United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1353

n.6, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1166, 1170 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)).
116 Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1353 n.6.
157 See Complaint 1 (" [These goods... have become well known... as being fashionable
and
of the finest quality available."); id. 15 ("[O]nly the finest materials available are used to make
Hermes' products."); id. 20 ("mT1he extraordinary high quality of Hermes' products generally, have
caused the media to give considerable attention to Hermes.").
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quality. Thus, the concerns mentioned in Torkington
and emphasized in Ledererde
5
ParisII are simply not present in Stolman1 1
Another aspect of the post-sale confusion doctrine is that it protects the
purchaser of the authentic good from being harmed by knockoffs in the market
that will diminish the prestige of the product for which they paid full price. The
Second Circuit noted that "the purchaser of an original is harmed by the
widespread existence of knockoffs because the high value of originals, which
derives in part from their scarcity, is lessened." 5 9 It is equally plausible, however,
that the reverse is true; the presence of knockoffs in the market may only provide
more publicity for a prestigious product. Here, the old axiom that "there is no
such thing as bad press" easily applies. Stolman himself even states that he
knocked off the most famous handbag in the world.16 ° To use another cich6,
"imitation is the sincerest form of flattery." Although the Jelly Kelly does not
amount to the parodies that have been discussed in trademark law, 6 ' Hermes
could have recognized that the Jelly Kelly would not affect the quality or market
for their product and let it pass, possibly resulting in less press for the Jelly Kelly.
In the cases of high priced goods, the fear is that people buying the knockoff
good will pass a poor quality product off as the original which it resembles. The
doctrine of "illegitimate prestige" protects "unwary observers from mistakenly
assuming, based on a cursory inspection, that a handbag carried by another
person was a Hermes if she was actually toting a less expensive or elite pocketbook."' 6 2 As the Second Circuit in LedererdeParisI/noted, it would go against the
public interest to be "deceived ...if it requires expertise to distinguish between
an original and a knockoff."' 63 In Lederer de ParisII, the court found post-sale

s This Note also argues that the holding of post-sale confusion in Lederrde Paris Iactually runs
contrary to the stated goals of post-sale confusion but on a lesser scale than Stolman. The factual
differences between the two cases, namely the material of the knockoffs and the proximity of the
products, raise the level of probability of post-sale confusion higher in Ledererde Paris II. 219 F.3d
104. Another distinguishing fact is that Ledererde Paris II made it all the way to the Second Circuit,
whereas inStolman the litigants were not afforded the opportunity to present factual evidence about
the sophistication of consumers to the court or confusion of the general public. 219 F.3d 104;
Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
159Lederer de ParsII, 219 F.3d at 108.
IN)See Complaint 27.
161 See N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. N.Y., N.Y. Hotel, Inc., 293 F.3d 550,62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1260
(2d Cir. 2002) (holding that use of stock exchange and other famous New York City landmarks in
casino did not constitute infringement because parody purpose was evident); Hormel Foods Corp.
v.Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the
maker of SPAM luncheon meat did not establish likelihood of confusion in defendant's cinematic
use of a puppet named "Spa'am" because it constituted parody).
162 Bartow, supra note 40, at 774.
163 Lederer de Paris 11, 219 F.3d at 108.
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confusion when the defendants had been knocking off Hermes handbags and
selling them around the corner from the Manhattan Hermes boutique.'64 Relying
on a 1955 case, the Second Circuit reversed the District Court, which was not
convinced that the defendant's products harmed the public in the post-sale
context. 16 ' The Second Circuit was convinced of the harm to the public, holding
that "a loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes
and
it off to the public as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing public
166
achieving the status of owning the genuine article at a knockoff price.'
Are we really that worried about what a person thinks when they view a
product on the side of the street? Can the law truly be shaped to cover that
situation? This Note argues that protecting the public in a situation where the
authentic good is expensive, rare, and prestigious contravenes the true purpose
of trademark law because it protects the public from harmless copying. If, as in
the Stolman situation, no actual harm will accrue to the trademark holder, there is
no purpose in protecting the general public from harm in the post-sale arena.
2. Protecling the Trademark Holder. Along with protecting the general public,
post-sale confusion functions to protect the trademark holder from having an
infringer saturate the market with knockoffs that will lessen the scarcity and
prestige of the original product. 6 ' Although Hermes International was involved
in the Lederer de Pariscases and the litigation that is the centerpiece of this Note,
the following points will distinguish the two cases and further argue that the
likelihood of harm to Hermes in the Stolman case (and situations like it) is much
less than in Lederer de Paris.
Just as the point-of-sale confusion analyses were heavily fact based, so are the
analyses for post-sale confusion. In the Lederer de Parislitigation, the companies
selling the knockoffs priced them as high as $27,000, while the price of a authentic
Kelly bag ranges from $5,000 to $30,000.168 Thus, when the prices are closer in
range, even a sophisticated consumer might think that they were purchasing the
real thing. In contrast, Mr. Stolman sold the Jelly Kelly for $145.169
A second distinguishing factor is the material of which the bags were made in
each case. In Stolman, the bags were made of a synthetic rubber material,1 ° about
which Mr. Stolman is quoted as saying is the "cheapest material in the world."''

164

Id.at 106.

165 Id. at

108 (relying on Mastercrafters Clock& Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 105 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160 (2d Cir. 1955)).
166
167

Id.at 109.
Id.

Id at 106.
169Complaint
1"9

7, Id.

26.

29.

171 Id
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The bags sold by Lederer de Paris are presumably made of leather and other fine
materials, given that they are "indistinguishable from genuine Hermes
products."' 72 Although Hermes has created Birkin and Kelly bags from rubber
material in the past, they claim to use only the finest rubber-Amazonia, an
environmentally friendly rubber found only in the Amazon.173 Thus, in the postsale context, this cheap rubber is unlikely to confuse consumers who may know
that Hermes has made rubber handbags in the past. Even members of the
general public viewing the bag are unlikely to think that it is an original given
Hermes's self-declared high level of quality. The difference in price and material
distinguishes Lederer de Paris II and its finding of post-sale confusion from
Stolman.'74
As quoted above,'7 5 Torkington also deals with the harm to the trademark
holder. 76 Just as in the harm to the public analysis, there are conditions implied
regarding application of the post-sale confusion rationale to the trademark holder.
Again, none of these conditions are satisfied in a situation like Stolman. One of
the conditions is that the trafficker of the counterfeit good attract "some
customers who would otherwise purchase the authentic goods."' 77 Given the
price of the original ($5,000+) and the price of the knockoff (about $150),
however, the wallet of a purchaser of an authentic Birkin or Kelly is unlikely to
be phased by buying both. Thus, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Jelly
Kelly would serve as a substitute for the real thing for a person who can afford
the authentic bag and gets off the waiting list. Therefore, the "loss" to Hermes
required for post-sale confusion does not occur.
Torkington also implies that a loss of business for the trademark holder is a
significant factor in finding post-sale confusion.'78 Indeed, the Second Circuit
weighed in on this issue of transferring goodwill, finding that "in the post-sale
context" a buyer might be "affected by the sight of appellee's stitching pattern on
appellants' jeans and, consequently, to transfer goodwill."' 79 Thus, where it would
be difficult to tell the difference between the products from a cursory glance at
the relevant trademark, whether it be a lock and flap closure or pocket stitching,
it is possible that post-sale confusion might exist, and from this confusion, the
business and goodwill the trademark holder has worked so hard to achieve will
be diminished. This is not the case in a situation like Stolman, however, where

Ledererde Paris1,50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1257, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
17 Complaint 15-16.
174 Cf Lederer de ParisI, 219 F.3d 104; Stolman, No. 03 Civ. 3722.
175 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
176 See Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1353 n.6.
172

177 Id
178
179

See id.
Lois Sportswear,799 F.2d at 875.
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members of the general public will not transfer their goodwill because many of
them did not have the money to pay for an authentic bag to begin with.
Furthermore, because of the widespread knowledge of the presence of knockoff
bags, it can reasonably be inferred that the general public is on the lookout for a
fake and is less easily confused than the courts think. 8 '
Since Stolman poses an unlikely scenario for post-sale confusion,
free
competition in the marketplace is a better policy goal for courts in such unique
trademark cases. The Second Circuit has held that courts should exercise
"particular 'caution,' when extending protection to product designs."'' Given
that trade dress claims raise the risk that relief will impermissibly afford a level of
protection that "would hamper efforts to market competitive goods,"18 2 courts
must construe the Lanham Act "in the light of a strong federal policy in favor of
vigorously competitive markets."'8 3
3. Other Juisdietions and the Restatement. Although post-sale confusion has
seemingly been adopted as an actionable claim in the Second Circuit, other
jurisdictions have not granted post-sale confusion this status." s Importantly, the
jurisdictions that have recognized post-sale confusion have included an important
limitation, namely that confusion of the general public is only actionable if it "is
likely to cause harm to the commercial interests of the trademark owner. '
Thus, even in a jurisdiction that allows post-sale confusion to be actionable,
because the Jelly Kelly will not harm Hermes's commercial interests or goodwill,
it should not be afforded the protection of post-sale confusion.
Post-sale confusion actions are based on the idea that Congress extended the
scope of the Lanham Act in 1962 to cover more than just the actual or potential
11J Bartow, supra note 40, at 773-74.
181

Yurman Design, Inc. v. Paj, Inc., 262 F.3d 101,114,59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1813,1820 (2d Cit.

2001) (citing Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 380, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1646 (2d Cir. 1997)).
182 Landcape Forms, 113 F.3d at 380.
'8 Id at 379.
18 See Ekc. Design & Saks, Inc., 954 F.2d 713; PeriniCor ., 915 F.2d 121. But see Libman Co. v.
Vining Indus., Inc., 69 F.3d 1360,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1751 (7th Cit. 1995) (holding that post-sale
confusion is actionable); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1026 (7th Cit. 1998) (finding post-sale confusion actionable).
185 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPErITION, § 20, cmt. b, reporter's note; see Perini

Corp., 915 F.2d at 128 (holding that "it must be shown that public confusion will adversely affect the
plaintiff's ability to control his reputation among its laborers, lenders, investors, or other group with
whom the plaintiff interacts... [and that an] infringement case under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
cannot be made out by merely presuming that the public will be confused without an identification
of how the forecasted public confusion will 'damage' the plaintiff"). Butsee Esercizio v. Roberts, 944
F.2d 1235,1244,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,1009 (6th Cit. 1991) ("[O]nce a product is injected into
commerce, there is no bar to confusion, mistake or deception occurring at some future point in

time.").
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purchasers when they struck out the word "purchasers" from section 43(a).' 86
Jurisdictions adopting this broad approach have employed the notion that
trademark laws "protect the general public."' 87 Similarly, these courts have held
that trademark laws protect against cases "in which confusion or deception occurs
on a subliminal or subconscious level, causing the consumer to identify the
properties and reputation of one product with those of another."' 88
Other courts have interpreted the legislative intent differently, however,
holding that "in the case of goods and services that are sold, the inquiry will turn
on whether actual or potential 'purchasers' are confused."' 89 This Note does not
take a position concerning whether or not to recognize post-sale confusion as an
actionable claim. Rather, this Note argues that post-sale confusion may be valid
in some circumstances but not in a situation similar to Stolman and the Jelly Kelly,
where the original good is so expensive and rare that neither the general public
nor the actual or prospective purchaser would be confused.
The Third Restatement of Unfair Competition also deals with post-sale
confusion, recognizing the split between jurisdictions on the overall issue and
adopting the view that post-sale confusion is only actionable when "likely to cause
harm to the commercial interests of the trademark owner."' 90 This is the truly
practical approach if post-sale confusion is to be actionable. If the effect on the
186 See Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836,843,210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 711,

717 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that "likelihood of confusion cannot be considered in a vacuum...
[and that the court] must broadly define the nature of the forbidden confusion and the class of
people whose confusion is forbidden"); see also Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs.,
Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 295, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1625 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting J. Thomas
McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.7 (4th ed. 2002) ("In 1962,
Congress struck out language in the Lanham Act which required confusion, mistake or deception
of 'purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services.' Several courts have noted this
expansion of the test of infringement and held that it supports a finding of infringement when even
non-purchasers are deceived.")).
187 Fleischmann Distilling v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 156,136 U.S.P.Q. 508,514 (C.A.
Cal. 1963) (quoting Stork Rest., 166 F.2d at 359) (holding that the general public is "that vast
multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who in making purchases,
do not stop to analyze, but are governed by appearance and general impressions").
188 Koppers, 517 F. Supp. at 844.
189 Ekec. Design & Saks, 954 F.2d at 716.
190RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 20, cmt. b, reporter's note. An
illustration after Comment b depicts the Restatement's approach well:
Although two competing manufacturers of printing presses use similar
trademarks, persons in the printing industry can easily distinguish them. Visitors
touring printing facilities, however, are confused into believing that both presses
originate from the same source. Neither manufacturer is subject to liability for
infringement because the confusion does not threaten the commercial interests
of the trademark owners.
Id. § 20, cmt. b, illus. 1.
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general public can be a source of damages based on confusion, allowing damages
and injunctive relief when there has been no harm to the commercial interests of
the trademark owner would be unjust. Allowing a post-sale confusion claim
without a showing of harm to the trademark owner would also run against the
statutory language and intent of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.' 9'
The Third Restatement also recognizes that "not every instance of potential
confusion by third persons sufficiently threatens the commercial interests of the
trademark owner to constitute an infringement."'9 " Because the confusion "must
present a significant risk to the sales or good will of the trademark owner," it
would be impossible for every situation of possible post-sale confusion to actually
result in infringement liability.' 93 When the facts of Stolman are applied to the
Third Restatement standard, it is easy to see that post-sale confusion cannot exist
in such situations. A one hundred and fifty dollarJelly Kelly simply will not harm
the market Hermes legitimately controls for its authentic Birkin and Kelly bags,
which retail for over five thousand dollars. Furthermore, the goodwill Hermes
has garnered for its high quality and excellent craftsmanship will not be harmed
by post-sale confusion because, on sight, there is no way to confuse the precise
stitching and lock and flap closure of an original with a knock-off Jelly Kelly.
Even if members of the public are confused when purchasers are not, by adopting
the Restatement's "harm to commercial interest" approach, the trademark owner
and the public are saved from4 an overreaching trademark regime that protects
9
when no harm has occurred.
III. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to argue for a more practical and realistic standard
in judging consumer sophistication under trademark law's likelihood of confusion
analysis. This new standard should only apply in a situation like Stolman, where
the authentic goods are so expensive, rare, and unique that there is no possibility
for confusion. This Note is not a call for courts to reject the likelihood of
confusion standard altogether. Courts, for the past sixty years, have alluded to
likelihood of confusion as the key element of trademark and trade dress
infringement claims, and this should continue. It is only in a situation like Stolman,
where the sophistication of consumers creates no likelihood of point-of-sale

191 See Lanham Act

§ 43(a),

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (stating that person who uses false

representation is liable to a person "who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged')
(emphasis added); Penni Co., 915 F.2d at 128.
192 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20, cmt. b.
193

Id.

194

Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2004

27

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 9

J. INTELL PROP.L

... [Vol. 12:255

confusion and the lack of harm to the public and Hermes creates no actionable
post-sale confusion, where this Note argues for a change. This change should be
a move towards a more realistic and practical understanding of consumers, as in
the Restatement, where a court recognizes in the point-of-sale context that
consumer sophistication can trump the other confusion factors. Furthermore, a
practical and realistic application of the post-sale confusion doctrine would
require definitive proof of harm to the commercial interests of the trademark
holder, and not merely the possibility that the general public might be harmed by
the presence of knock-offs in the market. In both point-of-sale and post-sale
confusion analyses, courts should recognize that consumers are not as easily
fooled as many judges depict them. Application of traditional consumer
sophistication analysis in these unique situations protects purchasers and the
general public whom are not truly confused and unnecessarily extends the
Lanham Act to protect the trademark holder. For a more justified, modernized
and updated analysis, a court should allow such above-average sophistication to
trump other confusion factors.
MEAGHAN E. GOODWIN
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